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RECENT DECISIONS
upon each default for the appropriate remedy. The new involuntary wage
assignment acts "provide a hopeful road to [the] prevention of large ar-
rearages, that extra load on court docket, and the thankless and usually
unprofitable time consuming collection task for the lawyers." 53 Public welfare
laws, although being damned currently by some, are not going to be repealed
by any progressive legislature; however, they should not enable an individual
by merely refusing to comply with a support order to shift his burden,
however temporary, upon the public. Wage assignment laws prevent de-
pendents, because of financial necessity, from having to resort to public
welfare because of inadequate means to enforce current payments, which
is inherent in the time consuming and expensive procedures ordinarily
available to these persons. Through procedures facilitating wage deductions
of the current obligations, the legislature is placing the primary obligation of
support upon the proper individual.
ROGER A. OLSON
CONCURRENT JURISDICTION IN MARITIME DEATH-FAITH IN A SEA FABLE?
The Federal Death on the High Seas Act' gives a right of action for
wrongful death where the locus delicti is the high seas. In the very language
of the Act authorizing this action, there seems to be a clear provision stated
as to the forum in which the action must be brought. Section One of the Act
provides:
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act,
neglect, or default occurring on the high seas beyond a marine league
from the shore of any State, or the District of Columbia, or the
Territories or dependencies of the United States, the personal repre-
sentative of the decedent may maintain a suit for damages in the
district courts of the United States, in admiralty, for the exclusive
benefit of the decedent's wife, husband, parent, child, or dependent
relative against the vessel, person, or corporation which would have
been liable if death had not ensued.2 (Emphasis added.)
Upon reading this section, it would come as no surprise to learn that the
majority of courts have understood the Act to limit the forum in which the
death action can be brought to the admiralty side of the federal district
courts.3 However, the New York Court of Appeals in the recent case of
53. Berns, supra note 40 at 917.
1. 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-767 (1958).
2. 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1958).
3. National Airlines v. Stiles, 268 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S.
885 (1959) ; Noel v. Linea Aeropostal Venezola, 247 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 907 (1957); Turner v .Wilson Line of Mass., 242 F.2d 414 (1st Cir. 1957); Higa
v. Transocean Airlines, 230 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 802 (1956);
The Silverpalm, 79 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1935); The Vestris, 53 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1931);
Wilson v. Transocean Airlines, 121 F. Supp. 85 (N.D. Cal. 1954); lafrate v. Cornpagnie
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Ledet v. United Aircraft Corp. held that the death action created by the
Act is equally maintainable in the common law courts of the states.4 The
court handed down their decision in an inconspicuous per curiam opinion.
Chief Judge Desmond, alone, was alert to dissent.
The court's frugal argumentation stresses only two factors of statutory
construction in attempting to get at legislative intent upon the question of
forum. Even these are abruptly handled. The court in making their first
argument consults the language of the Act but only Section Seven.r When
properly construed, the court reasons, Section Seven must be taken to
preserve to the state common law courts the power to hear actions (remedial
jurisdiction) brought pursuant to the Act. Next, the court proceeds upon the
basis of tradition. There has been a broad and pervasive tradition according
to which the state common law courts have shared with the federal admiralty
courts power to hear actions grounded upon the federal maritime law.
Legislative intent in the Death on the High Seas Act must be viewed against
this background of concurrent jurisdiction. The court discerns and applies this
tradition in these words:
The time-honored practice of concurrent jurisdiction allowed under
the Judiciary Act of 1789 and perpetuated in the Federal Employers'
Liability Act ... and the Jones Act ... should be applied, it would
seem, unless the intention of Congress is clearly to the contrary.0
Of these two points only the second can be considered consequential
at this stage in the debate over the question of forum raised in the Death
on the High Seas Act. It is the sum of the living parts found to support state
remedial jurisdiction in prior cases. In rudimentary form this is the argument
upon which the prevailing New York cases, which held for state remedial
G~n~rale Transatlantique, 106 F. Supp. 619 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Eagan v. Donaldson Atlantic
Line, 37 F. Supp. 909 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); Echavarria v. Atlantic & Carribean Steam Nay.
Co., 10 F. Supp. 677 (E.D.N.Y. 1935); Birks v. United Fruit Co., 48 F.2d 656 (S.D.N.Y.
1930); Dall v. Cosulich, 1936 Am. Mar. Cas. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1936); In re Rademaker's
Estate, 166 Misc. 201, 2 N.Y.S.2d 309 (Surr. Ct. 1938).
See also Morgan v. United States, 102 F. Supp. 275 (D. Conn. 1951); Lacey v. L. W.
Wiggens Airways, Inc., 95 F. Supp. 916 (D. Mass. 1951); In re Nelson, 168 Misc.
161, 5 N.Y.S.2d 398 (Surr. Ct. 1938); Gilmore & Black, The Law of Admiralty 304
(1957); Comment, 41 Cornell L. Q. 243 (1956); Annot., 66 A.L.R.2d 997 (1959).
Contra, Sierra v. Pan American World Airways, 107 F. Supp. 519 (D.P.R. 1952);
Batkiewics v. Seas Shipping, Co., 53 F. Supp. 802 (S.D.N.Y. 1943); Choy v. Pan
American Airways, 1941 Am. Mar. Cas. 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); Powers v. Cunard S. S. Co.,
32 F.2d 720 (S.D.N.Y. 1925); Wyman v. Pan American Airways, 1941 Am. Mar. Cas.
912 (Sup. Ct. 1941), aff'd, 262 App. Div. 995, 30 N.Y.S.2d 816 (1st Dep't 1941); Elliott
v. Steinfeldt, 254 App. Div. 739, 4 N.Y.S.2d 9 (2d Dep't 1938).
See also The Saturnia, 1936 Am. Mar. Cas. 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1936); Bugden v. Trawler
Cambridge, Inc., 319 Mass. 315, 65 N.E.2d 535 (1946); Robinson, Admiralty § 143 (1939);
Thompson, "Jurisdiction of Death in the Air," 1944 Ins. L. J. 654 (1944).
4. 10 N.Y.2d 258, 219 N.Y.S.2d 245 (1961).
5. 46 U.S.C. § 767:
"The provisions of any State statute giving or regulating rights of action or
remedies for death shall not be affected by this chapter."
6. Supra note 4 at 259, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 247.
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jurisdiction, turned.7 In so far as this tradition appears to be continued by
the Jones Act, which grants a right of action for the wrongful death of seamen
maintainable in the state courts, it has been found persuasive.8 Moreover,
this tradition as kept safe by the Judiciary Act of 1789 is thought by some
cases to be mirrored in the very words of Section Seven of the Act. 9 On the
other hand the language of Section Seven not vitalized by this tradition has
failed to weather the assault of the modern federal cases, which advocate the
mandatory admiralty forum.10 The harborage of this tradition, then, must
be considered the "last refuge" of state remedial jurisdiction under the
Death on the High Seas Act. As such it deserves the bulk of attention in
any present examination of the question of forum. In weighing the determi-
native worth of this tradition of concurrent remedial jurisdiction, it is necessary
to test it as it is borne out in its parts: state remedial jurisdiction as it
obtained in the historical development of maritime death actions, as it was
come by in the Jones Act, and to the extent it can rely on its protector, the
Judiciary Act. Afterwards, the modern federal cases and their use of the
language, legislative history, and terms of the Act may be briefly inspected.
To set the discussion, it might be well to summarily mark off the com-
monly accepted lines of admiralty jurisdiction, both remedial and substantive.
It is well established that in rem claims, which involve a direct proceeding
against a vessel, can be heard only by the federal admiralty courts." The
ordinary in personam claim grounded upon the general maritime law can
be brought in the common law courts.1s This is accomplished by the "saving
clause" of the Judiciary Act,13 which will be discussed hereafter. In personam
claims based upon the enacted federal maritime law can or cannot be brought
in the common law courts depending upon the will of Congress.' 4 While
7. Wyman v. Pan American Airways, 1941 Am. Mar. Cas. 912 (Sup. Ct. 1941),
aff'd, 262 App. Div. 995, 30 N.Y.S.2d 420 (lst Dep't 1941); Kristansen v. Steinfeldt, 255
App. Div. 824, 9 N.Y.S.2d 790 (2d Dep't 1939), no opinion; Colbert v. Steinfeldt, 255
App. Div. 790, 7 N.Y.S.2d 56 (2d Dep't 1938), no opinion; Murphy v. Steinfeldt, 254
App. Div. 741, 4 N.Y.S.2d 10 (2d Dep't 1938), no opinion; Elliott v. Steinfeldt, 254 App.
Div. 739, 4 N.Y.S.2d 9 (2d Dep't 1938), no opinion.
8. Choy v. Pan American Airways, 1941 Am. Mar. Cas. 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1941)
(Judge Clancey relied heavily on an analogy to the Jones Act in holding for state remedial
jurisdiction).
9. Sierra v. Pan American World Airways, 107 F. Supp. 519 (D.P.R. 1952). See also
Bugden v. Trawler Cambridge, Inc., 319 Mass. 315, 65 N.E.2d 535 (1946).
10. National Airlines v. Stiles, 268 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S.
885 (1959); Noel v. Linea Aeropostal Venezola, 247 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1957), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 907 (1957); Turner v. Wilson Line of Mass., 242 F.2d 414 (1st Cir.
1957); Higa v. Transocean Airlines, 230 F.2d 780 (9th Cir 1955); Wilson v. Trans-
ocean Airlines, 121 F. Supp. 85 (N.D. Cal. 1954) (this case probably represents the line
of demarcation for the modern federal cases, since it exhaustively examined the problem
and was possibly the first to make use of the internal legislative history of the Act).
11. Pope & Talbot v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953); The Hine v. Trevor, 71 U.S.
555 (1867); The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. 411 (1867).
12. Rounds v. Cloverport Foundry & Machine Co., 237 U.S. 303 (1915); Leon v.
Galceran, 78 U.S. 185 (1871).
13. Ibid. See also the discussion in Gilmore & Black, The Law of Admiralty 33 (1957).
14. See, e.g., Noel v. Linea Aeropostal Venezola, 247 F.2d 677 (2d 'Cir. 1957) ; Higa v.
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state remedial jurisdiction is extensive, state substantive jurisdiction, the
creating, as opposed to the enforcing of rights, is severely restricted. "No
such legislation is valid if it contravenes the essential purpose of an act of
Congress or works material prejudice to the characteristic features of the
general maritime law . . . ," thus expresses the formula laid down by the
United States Supreme Court in the case of Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen.'5
In an examination of the tradition of concurrent remedial jurisdiction, the
extent to which that tradition is verified by the history of maritime death
actions is significantly relevant. This is the particular area in which such
jurisdiction is claimed by virtue of the past; we should determine if in the
past state courts have exercised jurisdiction in entertaining actions for
maritime wrongful death. It was stated in the leading New York case of
Elliott v. Steinfeldt that the state courts had "long enjoyed" jurisdiction in
hearing such actions. 16 Looking backwards, it will be remembered that the
common law'7 and, like the common law, the general maritime law' 8 did not
allow recovery for wrongful death. With the passage of state death acts, the
common law began to enforce such a right of action. However, no comparable
federal death act was in force prior to the Death on the High Seas Act of
1920. The sole recovery allowed for maritime wrongful death in the interim
was by virtue of the so-called doctrine of constructive territoriality. The
doctrine might be described as the extra-territorial application of state death
acts to cover deaths occurring aboard vessels upon the high seas."9 The
rationale behind this extension of state law beyond its territorial borders to
regulate liability for wrongful death aboard vessels upon the high seas was
generally thought to rest in the state's power to govern the resident owners
of such vessels or to govern vessels registered at a port within the state.
Various obstacles stood in the path of the doctrine's development. Chief among
these were constitutional uncertainty over whether the states could fashion
a substantive right falling within the federal province of maritime law, and
doubt as to whether a state law could follow after a vessel upon the high
seas, since the law that usually applied aboard ship, the law of the flag,
was thought to be exclusively national law.20
The pioneer case of McDonald v. Mallory held that the New York
death act could be applied to allow recovery for maritime wrongful death,
where the vessel upon which the fatal act was committed was owned and
Transocean Airlines, 230 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1955) (holding that the Death on the High
Seas Act denies remedial jurisdiction to the state courts); Ship Mortgage Act, 46 U.S.C.
951 (1920).
15. 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
16. 254 App. Div. 739, 4 N.Y.S.2d 9 (2d Dep't 1938).
17. Panama R.R. v. Rock, 266 U.S. 209 (1924); Mobile Life Ins. Co. v. Brame, 95
U.S. 754 (1877); Geoghegan v. Atlas S. S. Co., 146 N.Y. 369, 40 N.E. 507 (1895).
18. The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886).
19. McDonald v. Mallory, 77 N.Y. 546 (1879).
20. Crapo v. Kelly, 83 U.S. (16 Wall) 610 (1872).
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registered in the state.2 1 Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court,
in the case of The Hamilton, allowed the similar application of the New
Jersey death statute where the vessel involved was owned by a New Jersey
corporation.22 The reach of the doctrine of constructive territoriality was
limited, however, by its own rationale. If it is remembered that state law
applied because of the state's power over its resident or corporate ship-
owners or over vessels registered at its ports, the short-comings of a doctrine
dependant upon such variable criteria can be easily seen. Consider the pos-
sible combinations of vessels, owners, and registries all calling a different
state death act into force. Although the resultant problem in conflicts of
law may not have been insurmountable, the courts soon reacted by refusing
to pick and choose among the various applicable state death acts, and as a
result allowed no recovery at all under any of the asserted state acts.
23
With the passage of the Death on the High Seas Act, Congress declared the
law and pre-empted the field of maritime wrongful death, thus ending the
operation of the state statutes under the doctrine of constructive territoriality
2 4
In all, only a "scattered few" cases had entertained actions for maritime
wrongful death under the doctrine.
2 5
The Elliott v. Steinfeldt2 6 claim of "long enjoyed" jurisdiction in hearing
maritime death actions hardly seems too substantial in view of the history of
the doctrine of constructive territoriality upon which the jurisdictional claim
rested. Not only was the doctrine seldom used, and at best an apparent
fiction which barely overcame the obstacles of more conventional legal con-
cepts, but it kept constantly bumping into its own short-comings. It was
never an established, sound, or universal remedy for maritime wrongful
death. Moreover, it died with the passage of the federal death statute.
Historically, though, it was the germ of a practice by which state courts did
entertain actions for maritime wrongful death.
While the light shed upon the question of forum raised under the Death
on the High Seas Act by the "long enjoyed" state court practice of hearing
maritime death actions brought under the doctrine of constructive ter-
ritoriality is thus diminished, it is at this point still perceivable. Can it be
extinguished? State courts had found remedial jurisdiction in maritime death
actions because they had evolved a substantive right of action for maritime
21. 77 N.Y. 564 (1879).
22. 207 U.S. 398 (1908) (Mr. Justice Holmes seems to base the state's power to
govern the death occurring aboard ship on the state's ability to regulate the corporate
owner of the vessel, which corporation was registered under the laws of the state).
23. The Middlesex, 253 Fed. 142 (D. Mass. 1916).
24. Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920).
25. The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398 (1908); Southern Pacific Co. v. De Valle Da Costa,
190 Fed. 689 (1st Cir. 1911); International Navigation Co. v. Lindstrom, 123 Fed. 475
(2d Cir. 1903); The James McGee, 300 Fed. 93 (S.D. N.Y. 1924); Souden v. Fore River
Shipbuilding Co., 223 Mass. 509, 112 N.E. 82 (1916); McDonald v. Mallory, 77 N.Y. 546
(1879).
26. 254 App. Div. 739, 4 N.Y.S.2d 9 (2d Dep't 1938).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
wrongful death under the doctrine of constructive territoriality. Their reme-
dial jurisdiction in maritime death actions was fatefully bound to that doctrine.
The dependence of their remedial jurisdiction in maritime death actions upon
this doctrine led that jurisdiction into frustration, decline, and ultimate
death as the doctrine, itself, suffered the same ill fortunes. This "long enjoyed"
remedial jurisdiction in maritime death actions based upon a state-fashioned
substantive right can make no demands upon the will of Congress where
Congress has ended that substantive right and replaced it by a new federal
right. In the face of the new federal death statute, the state courts must
do Congress' bidding.
One further comment should be made about the doctrine of constructive
territoriality and the claim for state remedial jurisdiction resting upon it.
The impetus behind that doctrine, which motivated the courts to stretch
the sense of more conventional concepts of law, were basic considerations
of justice. First, the denial of recovery for wrongful death itself is, to the
constitutions of all but the uninsured defendant, a very strong legal pill.
Secondly, the state courts themselves were faced with an unjust inconsistency
by allowing recovery for the landsman victim but not for his seafaring
neighbor. No such compelling considerations of justice can now move the
state courts to assume remedial jurisdiction where an adequate federal
remedy for maritime wrongful death is provided, unless it is the wickedness
of denying the plaintiff an opportunity to tell his story to a sympathetic
jury.
The second leg of the tradition discerned by the Court of Appeals is
that it lives in such enacted federal maritime law as the Jones Act.2 7 The
Jones Act incorporates the material jurisdictional provisions of the Federal
Employers' Liability Act, 5 which the court mentions, so that the provisions
of the latter need not be separately discussed. The Jones Act provided a right
of action for the wrongful death of seamen in these words:
... and in case of the death of any seaman as a result of any such
personal injury the personal representative of such seaman may
maintain an action for damages at law with the right of trial by
jury, and in such actions all statutes of the United States conferring
or regulating the right of an action for death in the case of railway
employees shall be applicable. Jurisdiction in such actions shall be
under the court of the district in which the defendant employer
resides or in which his principal place of business is located.29
(Emphasis added.)
Certainly, the words of the statute speaking of an action "at law with the
right to trial by jury" are patent. Remedial jurisdiction has to be given some
law court, the common law courts of the states or the federal civil courts,
27. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1958).
28. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1958).
29. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1958).
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to carry out this purpose. It cannot be accomplished by leaving the action
solely to the federal admiralty courts which sit without a jury. This language
was regarded as so vigorously in favor of entertaining the action at law that
the United States Supreme Court admitted that a plausible argument could
be made that the statute excluded the federal admiralty courts from juris-
diction, a construction which would render the statute unconstitutional."
However, the Supreme Court read-in admiralty jurisdiction, thus validating
the statute. It was early decided that the federal civil courts could entertain
actions brought under the statute,3 ' and shortly thereafter the common law
courts of the state were held to have the same power.32 The troublesome
language in the latter part of the quoted section which says "jurisdiction in
such actions shall be under the court of the district," was heard in an idiom
familiar to judges to mean not "jurisdiction" but venue. 33
The remedial jurisdiction allowed the state courts under the Jones Act
cannot be ascribed to the tradition of concurrent jurisdiction. The power of
the state courts to entertain actions brought pursuant to the Jones Act is
directly attributable to the intent of Congress as it is expressed in the very
language of the statute. The struggle with Congressional intent in the Jones
Act was a struggle with words, a struggle fought largely within the four
corners of the statute. This is apparent from the pains the various cases
have taken with the words of the statute.3 4 Thus the tradition of concurrent
jurisdiction, inasmuch as it was not a factor in interpreting the Jones Act,
was not perpetuated by it. Rather, this tradition, or actually the in fact
jurisdiction of the state courts, is merely the by-product of an interpretation
of the statute by means of its language. Contrary to the use the Court in
the Ledet case makes of the fact of state remedial jurisdiction under the
Jones Act, the proper use of that fact would seem to be to emphasize the
value of language, not tradition, in gauging Congressional intent in the
Death on the High Seas Act.
Next, the legacy of concurrent jurisdiction safeguarded in the "saving
clause" of the Judiciary Act of 1789 should be examined. The "saving clause"
of the Judiciary Act of 1789 preserved "to suitors, in all cases, the right of
a common law remedy where the common law is competent to give it.'
'35
30. Lindgren v. United States, 281 U.S. 38 (1930); Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart,
supra note 24.
31. Panama R.R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375 (1924).
32. Panama R.R. Co. v. Vasquez, 271 U.S. 557 (1926); Engel v. Davenport, 271
U.S. 33 (1926).
33. Panama R.R. Co. v. Johnson, supra note 31 (Mr. Justice Van Devanter remarked
that if "jurisdiction" meant "venue," the action had not been brought in either of the
specified districts).
34. Panama R.R. Co. v. Vasquez, supra note 32; Engel v. Davenport, supra note 32;
Panama R.R. Co. v. Johnson, supra note 31.
35. 35 Rev. Stat. 563, c. 8, 28 U.S.C. 41 (1941). The clause is now worded ".
saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled."
Apparently, no real change in the clause's effect on state remedial jurisdiction was intended.
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With Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, it became clear that the saving clause
of the Judiciary Act preserved solely remedial jurisdiction, the power to
hear actions, as opposed to substantive jurisdiction, the power to give rights
including rights of action. Clearly, then, no state-given action for wrongful
death on the high seas is preserved to "suitors" under the "saving clause."
As previously mentioned, the remedial jurisdiction allowed the state
common law courts under the "saving clause" is limited solely to entertaining
in personam maritime claims. It is precisely because the in rem maritime
claim, founded upon a distinctive maritime lien, has no counterpart in the
"common law" that the state common law courts have been denied the power
to hear these claims. Wrongful death actions, as Chief Judge Desmond
suggests in the Ledet case, are not "common law remedies" in the strict sense
but statutory remedies. Thus, strictly construing the words of the "saving
clause," the statutory remedy of maritime wrongful death cannot be saved
to "suitors" at the bar of the common law courts of the states. However, this
strict construction has more often than not given way to a more liberal
acceptation of the term "common law."'36
Mr. Justice Holmes often admonished that the common law is a creature
of both statute and case law. In fact it was in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen
that he pronounced: "The common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the
sky but the articulate voice of some sovereign or quasi-sovereign that can be
identified. . . . It is always the law of some State .... M"T If Holmes lost his
argument in attempting to save substantive jurisdiction where a "common law
remedy" can be had, his argument where remedial jurisdiction is at stake
seems timely, if a "common law remedy" is not to be rendered meaningless.
Even construed broadly, the "saving clause" is only another enactment of
Congress. Implicit in what we have said about the "saving clause" and its
grant of concurrent remedial jurisdiction there have been two critical as-
sumptions. Congress is of course free to give or retain, preserve or end,
remedial jurisdiction in the state courts in maritime matters, within con-
stitutional bounds which in shorthand form means they cannot give the
states in rem jurisdiction. It has also been assumed that Congress has not
spoken dearly in the Death on the High Seas Act, so that there is a need
to consult the oracles, over and above language, such as the tradition of
concurrent jurisdiction.
Before abandoning the Court's argumentation in Ledet, something should
be said of their first point, which drew on the language of Section Seven of
the Act. Section Seven states: "The provisions of any State statute giving
or regulating rights of action or remedies for death shall not be affected by
This seems to be the United States Supreme Court's understanding of the rewording in
Madruga v. Superior Court of California, 346 U.S. 556 (1954).
36. Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109 (1924); The Knapp, Staut
& Co., Company v. McCaffrey, 177 U.S. 638 (1900).
37. Supra note 15 at 222.
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this chapter." (Emphasis added.) Beginning with the words of this section,
before seeking analogies, we find that they purport to save "any State statute
giving or regulating rights of action" as well as "remedies." Clearly, the
words themselves attempt to do what we have seen in connection with the
"saving clause" is forbidden. They attempt to save state substantive juris-
diction or the state-given action for wrongful death on the high seas. The
courts apparently have tried to avoid the unconstitutional implication of
these words rather than strike down the statute.3 8
Yet, the Court of Appeals in the Ledet case, instead of simply iguoring
the language of Section Seven thereby leaving its constitutional infirmities
unexposed, seeks to use the language positively in support of state court
remedial jurisdiction. Ingeniously, the court says that if by latter-day con-
struction the substantive jurisdiction of the states in maritime matters is
denied, then it follows that Section Seven of the Act must mean that remedial
jurisdiction and not substantive jurisdiction is saved under the state death
acts. Thus, the bad apples of Section Seven are colored over to become
eye-appealing peaches. All of this is accomplished by analogy to the con-
struction placed upon the "saving clause," which construction ended the
efficacy of that clause as a vehicle of state substantive jurisdiction in admiralty
matters. That same construction never expanded the remedial jurisdiction
which the "saving clause" gave to the states in maritime matters. However,
the Court of Appeals in the Ledet case hurried after this analogy, the latter-
day construction of the "saving clause," passing over the meaning which the
language of Section Seven, itself, could supply. In applying this procedural
construction of the "saving clause" to Section Seven, the court transmuted the
meaning of this construction.39 Such glossy peaches are left that they are simply
too eye-appealing to consume.
The legislative history of Section Seven of the Act is really the clearest
proof of what Congress had attempted in that section. Section Seven in draft
form simply purported to save state death actions in so far as they applied
up to the one marine league limit within which the federal death statute does
not apply.40 When the bill was debated in the House of Representatives an
amendment was offered by Congressman Mann to delete that language from
Section Seven which limited the operation of state death acts to the one marine
league limit.41 The Congressman apparently believed that the bill would not
obtain passage as long as it curtailed the operation of state death acts.42
38. See Lindgren v. United States, supra note 30 at 44.
39. In his dissent in the Ledet case Chief Judge Desmond makes the point that
Section Seven of the Act preserves state court "remedies" only in so far as they come
under a "State statute giving or regulating rights of action or remedies for death .... "
The Chief Judge's observation serves to point out the awkwardness of construing that
section as a grant of remedial jurisdiction.
40. 59 Cong. Rec. 4482-86 (1920).
41. Ibid.
42. Choy v. Pan American Airways Co., supra note 8.
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Knowledge of that amendment provides us with the most plausible inter-
pretation of Section Seven, that is, that the section was simply intended to
allow state death acts to operate in those reaches not covered by the federal
statute. If one is willing to shunt this interpretation of the section aside and
delve into the "vicissitudes of its passage," all that is left is the reinforced
unconstitutional implication of that section. The true choices of possible
meaning of the section are either its very comfortable explanation as aimed
at saving state death acts within the marine league limit or its condemnation
as an unconstitutional attempt to preserve state substantive jurisdiction.
There is no need or reality in reaching to find an ingenious third interpretation.
To this point we have seen that the tradition of concurrent jurisdiction
asserted by the Court of Appeals in Ledet v. United Aircraft Inc. is not borne
out by the history of maritime wrongful death; nor can any "cross light" be
shed upon the question of forum raised in the Death on the High Seas Act
by virtue of the fact of state jurisdiction under the Jones Act. Neither has the
Judiciary Act of 1789 given so rich a legacy of concurrent jurisdiction to the
states that it is always dependable. Certainly, if the Judiciary Act can have
any value as a tool of interpretation it must be in those instances where Con-
gressional intent is uncertain and not readily divined from more immediate
sources such as the language and legislative history of the Act. In so far as
there is language in Section Seven of the Act hinting at state ,court remedial
jurisdiction, it does not furnish a sound realistic construction of the section.
Perhaps the court's whole argumentation and its error is summed up by Mr.
Justice Frankfurter:
Statutes come out of the past and aim at the future. They may carry
implicit residues or mere hints of purpose. Perhaps the most delicate
aspect of statutory construction is not to find more residues than
are implicit nor purposes beyond the bounds of hints.43
Perhaps in some measure the Ledet decision can be excused on the basis of
the particular New York precedent holding for state court remedial jurisdiction.
Elliot v. Steinfeld was the first of this line of authority. It was a decision that
came eighteen years after the passage of the Death on the High Seas Act. The
decision was rendered in a Memorandum opinion of the Appellate Division.
The case turned upon, as was mentioned, the "long enjoyed" remedial juris-
diction that the state courts supposedly had under the doctrine of constructive
territoriality. Three other decisions growing out of the same aircrash involved
in the Elliott case were heard by the same court.44 All were decided without
opinion upon the authority of the Elliott case. Subsequently, an independent
case was similarly decided by one of the lower courts without an officially
43. Frankfurter, "Reflections on Reading Statutes," in The Supreme Court: Views
from Inside 82 (Westin ed. 1961).
44. Kristen v. Steinfeldt, 255 App. Div. 834, 7 N.Y.S.2d 56 (2d Dep't 1939) ; Colbert
v. Steinfeldt, 255 App. Div. 790, 4 N.Y.S.2d 56 (2d Dep't 1938); Murphy v. Steinfeldt,
254 App. Div. 741, 4 N.Y.S.2d 10 (2d Dep't 1938).
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printed opinion45 and was affirmed at the Appellate Division level without
comment.4 6 The same case eventually reached the Court of Appeals on another
question, where it was affirmed.4 7 This, then, represents the New York
authority in favor of a permissive state forum under the Death on the High
Seas Act. Prior, however, to the Elliott case there were a few New York cases
pulling in the direction of the mandatory admiralty forum.48 The New York
Court of Appeals cannot be said to have been intractably committed to prece-
dent favoring the permissive state forum. The most that can be said is that
if the court's judgment was vacillating, unpersuaded by either position on the
question, then the New York authority favoring the permissive state forum
could properly conclude the issue.
The modern federal cases are rather numerous,4 9 the best reasoned and
most thorough of these being Judge Goodman's decision in Wilson v. Transocean
Airlines, Inc.50 These cases press home three tools of statutory construction,
the language, terms, and legislative history of the Act.
A very careful and almost purposeful reading of Section One of the Death
on the High Seas Act will uncover the courteous little word "may." It is
used as follows: ".... the personal representative of the deceased may maintain
a suit for damages in the district courts of the United States, in admiral-
ty. . . ." Proponents of the permissive state forum insist that "may" is used
to indicate that plaintiffs may or may not bring the death action "in ad-
miralty." 51 Accordingly, plaintiffs are supposedly free to sue in the state
common law courts. If the word is taken in its "ordinary and usual sense,"
this petty equivocation disappears and there is no need for construction. The
context very clearly brings out the meaning of the word since the word is used
to allow a cause of action where none existed previously--"the personal repre-
sentative may maintain an action." It is certainly the word employed by
legislatures in creating death actions. Even the Jones Act and the New York
death act use the very same word, the personal representative, "may maintain
an action."52 Neither will the word "may" bear the meaning given it by those
favoring the permissive state forum. If plaintiffs may sue in any court, the
mention of a specific court becomes surplusage. "May" may well be said.
45. Wyman v. Pan American Airways, supra note 7.
46. Ibid.
47. Wyman v. Pan American Airways, Inc., 181 Misc. 963, 43 N.Y.S.2d 420 (Sup.
Ct. 1943), aff'd, 293 N.Y. 878, 59 N.E.2d 785 (1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 882 (1945).
48. In re Rademaker's Estate, 166 Misc. 201, 2 N.Y.S.2d 309 (Surr. Ct. Kings County
1938). See also In re Nelson, 168 Misc. 161, 5 N.Y.S.2d 398 (Surr. Ct. 1938).
49. See supra note 11.
50. 121 F. Supp. 85 (N.D. Cal. 1954).
51. This was argued without avail in Noel v. Linea Aeropostal Venezola, supra
note 14.
52. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1952):
"the personal representative of the deceased may maintain an action for damages
at law . . .;
N.Y. Dec. Est. Law § 130: "the executor or administrator . . . may maintain an
action to damages ... .
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Although this argument over the term "may" is really only nice legal
exercise, by deluging all ambiguity in Section One it heightens the strength
of the positive expressions in that section. There is no escaping, then, from
the patent meaning of "may maintain a suit for damages in the federal
district courts, in admiralty." Additional language confirms this meaning.
Section One says that the action is maintainable "against [first] the vessel,
person or corporation.", A "vessel" can be proceeded against only in the federal
admiralty courts, who alone may entertain in rem claims. In Section Three
of the Act there is a provision made for extending the period of limitations
if "reasonable time for securing jurisdiction of the vessel . . ." is not had.
Other provisions of the Act are in accord with the view that the admiralty
forum is mandatory. Section Five provides that where, after instituting an
action for personal injuries in an admiralty court, the plaintiff dies, his personal
representative may be substituted as a party plaintiff. Again, the Act con-
templates only the admiralty plaiitiff. Section Six establishes a rule of com-
parative negligence, a rule little know in the common law courts. Section Two
and Four are not too conclusive one way or the other.53
When the Death on the High Seas Act was debated in bill form in the
House of Representatives, the question of forum did come up.54 In the case
of Higa v. Transocean Airlines, the court took it as determinative that Con-
gressman Volstead, the author of the bill, in answer to inquiries as to why
the right to trial by jury had been excluded from the Act, stated that it was
his understanding that this was so because the action was to be brought only
in the federal admiralty courts. 5 It might be noted that while the Court of
Appeals in Ledet mentioned nothing of the legislative history of the Act,
the counsel for plaintiffs in their brief gave extensive space to a favorable
treatment of the legislative history of the Act in support of state court remedial
jurisdiction. 56 Possibly this helps to explain the court's neglect of this source
of statutory construction.
In conclusion, the answer to the question of whether an action brought
pursuant to the Death on the High Seas Act must be brought on the admiralty
side of the federal district courts appears with reasonable certainty to be in
the affirmative. Criticism of Ledet v. United Aircraft Corp. is warranted. The
Court seemed to place faith in a tradition that was largely inappropriate and
remote in solving the question presented. It seemed to be searching after a
53. The court in Bergeron v. KLM, 188 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) thought that
-Section Four, which provides that a death action grounded upon the law of any foreign
nation may be brought in admiralty, also provided for exclusive remedial jurisdiction in
admiralty.
54. 59 Cong. Rec. 4483 (1920).
"Mr. Moore of Virginia. . . . The purpose of this bill, as I understand it
is to give exclusive jurisdiction to the admiralty courts where accidents occur
on the high seas. Mr. Volstead. That is it."
55. Higa v. Transocean Airlines, 230 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1955).
56. Respondent's Brief, 7351 Cases & Points, Case 2, pp. 15-20.
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tradition, or perhaps what might better be called a policy, rather than taking
the more common place approach to the problem of statutory construction.
Perhaps so much similarity between the Death on the High Seas Act, especially
Section Seven, and the broad contours of state concurrent jurisdicton presented
to the court's mind a compelling image of grand moment and handsome
symmetry. Perhaps the court took repose in its vision. There is more concrete
explanation of the court's decisidil in terms of New York precedent, the use
of legislative history by plaintiffs' counsel, and the court's zealous concern
over its own powers.
If the court's decision can properly be criticized, their fellow travelers
must be the draftsmen of the Act and even Congress, itself. Perhaps the drafts-
men should have said "We really mean it" so that the courts would disregard
the apparent tradition of concurrent jurisdiction. Certainly Congress should
have averted, not compounded, the confusion built into the act by the delib-
erately ambiguous amendment of Section Seven. Careless wording and seeming
tradition produced the problem of forum in the Act. Decision makers and law
makers might well heed this caveat:
Men and not monsters warp the bounds of the sea.
Yet may not thoughtless men still monsters be?
Not fate but men
Unlock the energies of the rock.5
7
DONALD P. SIMET
NAVIGATIONAL SERVITUDE: AN OLD CONCEPT WITH A NEW LIMITATION
The Federal Government, through its sovereign power of eminent domain,
has the right to acquire private property for public use.' The Fifth Amend-
ment requires the Government to compensate the owner of property thus
appropriated.2 Through authority given it by the commerce clause of the
Constitution, the Government also has the power of navigational servitude.3
Navigational servitude, also termed "dominant servitude ' 4 or "superior navi-
gation easement," 5 allows the Government to control the navigability of an
interstate waterway by regulating its flow.6 This regulation contemplates the
acquisition of private property. The power of navigational servitude, like
that of eminent domain, is superior to private interests.7 However, unlike
57. Howard Baker, Ode to the Sea, in Oxford Book of American Verse 1017 (1960).
1. Adirondack Railway Co. v. New York State, 176 U.S. 335, 346 (1900).
2. Id. at 347.
3. United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222, 224 (1956).
4. Federal Power Commission v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 347 U.S. 239,
249 (1954).
5. United States v. Grand River Dam Authority, 363 U.S. 229, 231 (1960).
6. United States v. Commodore Park, 324 U.S. 386, 390 (1945).
7. United States v. Twin City Power Co., supra note 3, at 225.
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